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ABSTRACT 
A priming paradigm and a paradigm requiring apparent duration judgments for 
tachistoscopic presentations were used to provide converging tests for prerecognition 
automatic semantic access and to investigate developmental changes in early 
processing. Subjects from four different age groups (fifth and sixth graders, college 
age, thirty year olds, fifty year olds) participated in each of the two experiments. In 
the priming task, prime stimuli were presented tachistoscopically for durations which 
had previously shown, for individual subjects, chance level detection of stimulus 
presence versus absence. In the duration judgment task, stimulus exposure durations 
were, for each age group, the means of the duration for chance level presence-absence 
detection. 
The priming paradigm did not provide evidence for automatic semantic 
facilitation for any age group. The data suggested a need to more clearly differentiate 
between a global lexical and a specific semantic access to long term memory. Prerecog­
nition processing was evident in two age groups in the apparent duration experiment, 
although the specifîc effects of lexical and semantic parameters differed from previous 
findings. Developmental differences were evident only in presence-absence detection 
thresholds; the other tasks did not reveal age-related changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Evidence for developmental changes in the sensory/perceptual and memorial 
systems that influence visual information processing has been well documented (Corso, 
1981; DiLollo, Arnett, & Kruk, 1982; La Berge & Samuels, 1974; Salthouse, 
1980). Some theorists have suggested that changes in attentional capacity, or resources 
available for conscious mental operations, are responsible for the improved memory 
performance of children as they mature (Frederich, 1974) and are also responsible for 
the impaired cognitive performance in older adults (Botwinick & Thompson, 1966). If 
attentional mechanisms are important in development, then it is important to clarify 
the nature of these processes and the modifying influence of maturation. 
Posner and Snyder (1975) propose that there are two distinctly different systems 
operating very early in the perceptual process: a conscious, attention demanding 
limited capacity system and an automatic system which operates nonconsciously and 
without intention. Recently, several research paradigms have been directed toward 
clarifying the distinction between automatic and attention-demanding 
processes. Cognitive theorists have classified automatic processing as occurring 
without conscious involvement and attention-demanding processing as occurring only 
with allocation of the subject's cognitive resources. Since previous research suggests 
that changes in attentional capacity may be a source of age-related changes, this 
distinction between automatic and attention-demanding processes has been used to 
study developmental information processing. Hasher and Zacks (1979) have argued 
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that tasks which require differential allocation of attentional resources should reveal 
developmental changes across the life span; contrariwise, tasks which are the domain 
of automatic mental processes should show improvement in performance during the 
years in which necessary knowledge or skill is acquired, but thereafter be impervious to 
change. 
LaBerge and Samuels (1974) state that beginning readers attend more to the 
graphological and phonological characteristics of words, and after these lower level 
processes become automatic, readers are better able to process higher level syntactic 
and semantic information. In fact, Fletcher (1981) has labeled beginning readers, 
"decoders" and older readers, "comprehenders." If automatic processing occurs in 
reading, then this development should be apparent as children develop into fluent 
readers and should not decline across the life span. 
Even though Hasher and Zacks suggest that automatic processing should not be 
impaired in older adults, the available evidence suggests a marked decrease in the 
overall efHciency of information processing (Botwinick, 1978; Burke & Light, 1981; 
Corso, 1981). The majority of the aging research has attempted to locate the 
processing stage or stages responsible for processing deficiencies that increase with 
age. Several studies reveal changes in duration of early sensory store (e.g., Kline & 
Orme-Rogers, 1978; Walsh & Thompson, 1978), encoding processes (e.g., Monge & 
Hultsch, 1971; Simon, 1979), and retrieval strategies (e.g., Hultsch, 1975; Thomas, 
Fozard, and Waugh, 1977) from young adults to old age. 
According to Salthouse (1980), research questions should not be stage-specific— 
answers to such questions are simplistic (Why would only one stage change with age?)— 
but should instead be phrased in terms of a general speed-loss mechanism. Thus, 
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age-related changes are best studied in terms of time needed to perform simple mental 
operations. If the entire information processing system slows with age, it is reasonable 
to hypothesize some effect on automatic, as well as attention-demanding, processes. 
Taking a different perspective, Rabbitt (1981) has criticized developmental 
researchers, arguing that models of cognition borrowed from experimental psychology 
have been derived from experiments on young adults, and these models do not accom­
modate inter- or intra-individual differences. Thus, according to Rabbitt, 
investigations of age-related changes must incorporate measures sensitive to individual 
differences and to the interaction of these factors with task parameters. For example, 
Rabbitt (1979) found that correct response latency and percent of errors were 
misleading indices of age-related changes in a choice reaction time 
experiment. Careful analyses revealed that overall response latencies for older subjects 
were as fast as for younger subjects; however, when only correct response latencies were 
considered, the average latency of the older subjects was longer. Interestingly, mean 
number of errors and average response latency for errors did not increase with 
age. The older subjects' response latency distribution was more positively skewed than 
the younger subjects. Rabbitt concluded that, rather than a general slowing of 
response speed, the older subjects could not optimize the speed/accuracy tradeoff as 
effîciently as the younger subjects. When the older subjects responded fast, they 
tended to make errors. In order to compensate, these subjects would slow down and 
"overshoot" the optimum latency, therefore producing some very long correct response 
latencies. The above example illustrates the importance of developing techniques that 
allow us to distinguish changes that have a locus within the system from those changes 
which produce a decline in overall processing efficiency. 
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The present study was designed to further clarify the concept of automatic 
processing and to investigate the nature of changes in automatic processing across the 
life span. A set of converging operations was used to: a) test for age-related differences 
in stimulus detection threshold, b) test the hypothesis that visual semantic information 
can be processed by a nonattentional automatic system, and c) investigate 
developmental changes in this automatic processing. 
Studies of automatic processing have limited the subjects' attentional resources by 
restricting the stimulus duration or requiring concurrent processing of a second 
stimulus; however, subjects were usually aware that some unattended information was 
available (Howard, Lasaga, & McAndrews, 1980; Rosinski, Golinkoff, & Kukish, 
1975). Other studies have restricted stimulus input to a subliminal level, and thus 
subjects had no conscious awareness of the unattended information (Fowler, Wolford, 
Slade, & Tassinary, 1981; Marcel, 1980). The following section reviews the theoretical 
background and relevant research from both types of automatic processing 
studies. Theories of automatic processing and the pertinent research are then 
considered in relation to life span changes in visual information processing. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The traditional information processing perspective in word recognition theories 
has emphasized the description of how information which impinges on the organism is 
transferred and/or transformed from one stage to another. An account of what 
happens between the observed stimulus input and observed response to that input is 
the goal of this type of theorizing (Estes, 1978). This perspective has tended to 
produce serial, discrete stage models within which researchers attempt to fit empirical 
data (e.g., Massaro, 1975; McClelland, 1979). Models of this type have been 
supported by research explicating the characteristics of each stage (e.g., Posner & 
Keele, 1967; Sperling, 1960; Thompson & Massaro, 1973; Tulving & Gold, 1963). 
The conventional approach has conceptualized the earliest visual sensory 
information in terms of an iconic storage system. Typically, studies have indicated 
that the preperceptual visual store or the iconic stage is a literal, spatial representation 
unaffected by abstract codes (Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Neisser, 1967; Sperling, 1960). 
Turvey (1978) suggests, however, that the icon may be the result of processing 
rather than the beginning of processing, and what is available in the icon for further 
analysis depends largely on the individual's prior knowledge about the world. 
Traditional concepts of the icon describe it as a visible representation. Turvey suggests 
that there is another type of visual representation; one that is visual but not visible— 
invisible because this visual information does not result in any conscious awareness on 
the part of the subject. 
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Merikle (1980) has also challenged the traditional concept of the icon and has 
presented evidence indicating that conceptual category membership can influence very 
early visual processing. In accord with several other theorists (e.g., Allport, 1977; 
Turvey, 1978), Merikle rejects the currently held concept of iconic storage and further 
suggests that information processing is better conceptualized as a continuous process 
rather than a series of static stages. 
It is certainly plausible to hypothesize that long term memory may be the 
controlling mechanism in perceptual selectivity. A stimulus may be analyzed for its 
semantic content, and on the basis of information stored in permanent memory, the 
probability of the stimulus information getting into the subject's awareness or 
consciousness may be enhanced or reduced. 
Automatic Processing 
Models for automaticity in visual stimulus identification have been provided by 
several theorists (e.g.. La Berge & Samuels, 1974; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977), all of whom share the assumption that automaticity operates with 
learned, well-practiced associations, and that new associations require attention and 
allocation of cognitive resources. Testing this assumption, Regan (1981) had subjects 
identify English letters (familiar stimuli) and newly learned Armenian letters 
unfamiliar stimuli). As expected, response latencies were longer for the Armenian 
letters and, more importantly, latencies increased as number of letters (set size) was 
increased. However, for the English letters, response latency did not increase with set 
size increments. These data suggested that the English letters were being processed 
automatically, independent of attention capacity, whereas identification of the 
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unfamiliar Armenian letters required increasing attentional resources with increasing 
set size. 
Navon (1977) has argued that some automatic processes are intrinsic to the 
perceptual system and do not require extensive practice; for example, an analysis of 
the global aspects of a display may occur automatically. Therefore, Regan (1981) 
conducted a second experiment using stimuli that were large letter shapes constructed 
with repeated printings of small letters; subjects were required to name the small 
form. The large letters either matched or mismatched the component small letters; for 
example, a large B could be made up of repeated small Bs, small Ds, or one of the 
Armenian letters(^). Regan's finding that both the English and Armenian large letters 
interfered with small letter naming when the two forms were incompatible was in 
accord with Navon's (1977) argument. Furthermore, there was greater interference 
from English letters, thus providing support for learned automaticity models such as 
La Berge and Samuels (1974), Posner and Snyder (1975), and Shiffrin and Schneider 
(1977). 
Several other researchers have tested the automaticity hypothesis by comparing 
the processing of visual/graphic versus abstract levels of representation. For example, 
Friedman (1980) asked subjects to make letter case and identity judgments for letters 
presented singly and for letters presented in same case and mixed case orthographically 
regular pseudowords. Subjects' performance for letter identification was not 
influenced by the number of letters in the stimulus array (single letters versus 
pseudowords), which suggested that the letters were processed simultaneously and 
automatically. However, accuracy for reporting the case of the target letter did decline 
as the number of letters in the stimulus array increased. Therefore, case identification 
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of the target letters was considered to be a nonautomatic process requiring that 
attention be directed to the critical letter before case information could be processed. 
Letter identification was independent of stimulus length, however, suggesting an 
automatic process in which all letters in the display were identified in parallel. 
Similar evidence was reported by McClelland (1976) who found that when 
subjects could make correct letter identification they were only 52% accurate in reports 
of letter case, and by McConkie (1979) who found no disruption in reading when 
letters were alternated between upper and lower case. Taken together, these studies 
argue convincingly that information extraction occurs at a more abstract level than 
visual features of letters, and that this process occurs automatically even when subjects 
are instructed to report visual characteristics of the display. 
Carr, Davidson and Hawkins (1978) suggest that although direct visual access to 
the mental lexicon does occur, subjects can strategically engage in an orthographic 
(spelling regularity) computation process which facilitates letter string decoding. To 
test this hypothesis, Carr and colleagues manipulated subjects' expectations and found 
that recognition accuracy for words and pseudowords was equal if subjects were 
expecting pseudowords. However, when subjects were expecting either nonsense 
strings or words, recognition accuracy for words was significantly higher than that for 
pseudowords which did not differ from that for nonsense strings. Apparently, subjects 
used spelling regularity as a decoding strategy only if they were led to expect 
pseudowords as stimuli. Thus, the authors suggest that direct semantic access can 
occur without letter decoding; however, the orthographic mechanism can operate in 
parallel to decode words not yet stored in the lexicon. (It is assumed that pseudowords 
would not be permanently encoded.) Coltheart, Davelaar, Jonasson, and Besner 
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(1977) also concluded that the available data are compatible with parallel subsystems 
analyzing visual and phonological information, recognition occurring with the 
summation of the products of these subsystems. They also allow that the data are not 
incompatible with a view that familiar words access the lexicon in a direct automatic 
fashion whereas the phonological system may be slower and only functional with 
unfamiliar items such as pseudowords. 
Findings such as these led Allport (1979) to suggest that letter recognition is not a 
necessary condition for the recognition of words and to propose an interactive system 
(Allport, 1977) which allows available lexical or other conceptual information to 
influence visual or sensory memory. Allport (1977, 1979) hypothesizes that all types of 
information (graphic, orthographic, phonological, syntactic, lexical, semantic, etc.) are 
processed in parallel and a "comparator," or some type of perceptual integration 
mechanism, combines all of this perceptual information. Recognition occurs when 
enough information from different systems has been "re-membered," or recombined, 
to give the subject a conscious percept. 
Massaro (1979) argues staunchly against an interactive model of word recognition 
stating that information at each stage can only influence the neighboring stage; thus 
low-level information (i.e., information in preperceptual store) would not remain intact 
to contribute to later processing stages. However, Massaro's criticism rests 
precariously on the assumption that the preperceptual store or the iconic stage is a 
literal, precategorical representation of approximately 250 msec duration. As 
discussed previously, this conceptualization of the iconic stage has been questioned 
(e.g., Merikle, 1980; Turvey, 1978). 
Semantic Facilitation 
A number of studies have attempted to further clarify the dimensions of 
information that are available automatically and the ways in which these dimensions 
may interact. Semantic memory has been conceived of as an associated network such 
that when a particular word is accessed, semantically related entries are activated and 
for a short time, are more easily available to the cognitive processing system (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Quillan, 1962, 1967; Treisman, I960). This conception of semantic 
memory has prompted attempts to explicate the facilitating effects of contextual 
information in language processing, and several experiments have specifically 
addressed this issue relative to semantic facilitation effects in word 
perception. Priming tasks have been used extensively in semantic access 
research. This paradigm involves sequential presentation of two (or more) words, the 
first word is hypothesized to "prime" or activate the associated memory network; 
target words that are semantically related to the prime word should therefore be more 
easily accessed. 
Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) asked subjects to make a lexical decision 
(word/nonword discrimination) to the second of two sequentially presented letter 
strings. They found shorter response latencies for semantically related pairs than for 
unrelated pairs; for example, subjects could decide that NURSE was a word more 
quickly if it had been preceded by DOCTOR than if it had been preceded by BREAD. 
This semantic facilitation effect has also been replicated by Neely (1976) and by 
Shaffer and LaBerge (1979); however, both of these studies reported inhibition from a 
prime word on an unrelated target word. It is usually assumed that the priming effect 
is automatic and nonattentional since one of the postulates of the automaticity theory 
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(Posner & Snyder, 1975) is that automatic processing does not interfere with other 
processes. Neely (1977) questioned the assumption of automaticity in the priming 
paradigm, given that priming may also produce inhibition. In a more rigorous 
evaluation of automatic semantic access, Neely (1977) orthogonally manipulated 
semantic access (relationship of prime and target) and conscious attention (stimulus-
onset asynchronies, the time interval from prime onset to target onset, ranging from 
250 to 2000 msec). The data showed that when subjects were not given time to direct 
their attention, semantically related primes provided facilitation and no inhibition; 
however, with longer SOAs (stimulus-onset asychronies), both facilitation and 
inhibition were operative. Thus, Neely suggested that when both of these processes are 
evident, they may be resulting from a conscious mechanism and should not be solely 
attributed to automatic activation of the semantic network. 
Other recent studies (Antos, 1979; Schvaneveldt & McDonald, 1981) have varied 
attention allocation and found evidence for two types of processes operating in a 
semantic priming task. In a tachistoscopic experiment (Schvaneveldt & McDonald, 
1981) with brief, pattern masked stimuli, there was no effect of semantic priming on 
feature detection; but there was a priming effect for a lexical decision task. Error 
analysis also revealed a high proportion of false positive responses to nonwords that 
were physically similar to words. In a companion reaction time experiment with 
stimulus presentation terminated by the subject's response, there was a strong effect of 
semantic priming in both the lexical task and the feature detection task. False positive 
responses to physically similar nonwords did not occur. Based on these data, 
Schvaneveldt and McDonald (1981) postulate a two stage process in early visual 
processing: 1) an initial analysis that processes features, word shapes, etc. and 
formulates a lexical hypothesis, and 2) a "second look" analysis which is driven by 
semantic memory and verifies or disconfirms the initial hypothesis. 
Semantic activation in the form of context provided by a sentence is another 
variant of the semantic priming paradigm. Stanovich and West (1979) had subjects 
read a context sentence prior to presentation of a target word which was either 
semantically related or unrelated to the sentence context. Word recognition time was 
slowed in half the trials by visual degradation of the target word. When the target was 
degraded, semantic facilitation decreased and inhibition increased. Results supported 
the two process theory; when word recognition was slowed, attentional mechanisms 
were operative as evidenced by the inhibition effects. Stanovich and West suggested 
that poor (and/or young) readers with weak word recognition skills rely more on 
contextual information because they have not developed the automaticity in word 
processing that fluent readers have. 
Several other studies have found evidence for automatic semantic access when 
context priming occurs with ambiguous words (Conrad, 1974; Holley-Wilcox & Blank, 
1980; Schvaneveldt, Meyer, & Becker, 1976). Typically, the priming stimulus is one 
which has two different meanings (e.g., BALL is semantically related to ROUND or 
DANCE). Although there has been a controversy between a selective-access (one 
meaning) and a multiple-access (multiple meanings) priming effect for ambiguous 
words (the literature providing more support for multiple access), the pertinent point 
here is that these studies provide further verification for the general claim of automatic 
semantic access models. 
Subliminal Processing 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this literature review is to consider the evidence 
for automatic semantic processing in visual word perception. According to the criteria 
of Posner and Snyder's (1975) theory, the cited research supports the influence of 
abstract or semantic units which operate without the subject's attention and without 
interfering with other processes. It is necessary, however, to meet another postulate of 
the theory and that is: Can information influence the subject's response without giving 
rise to awareness? In a review of the subliminal perception literature, Dixon (1971) 
defined some of the problems inherent in this controversial area. For instance, if 
perception is considered to involve recognition, then the term "subliminal perception" 
is a contradiction: If it is really subliminal, it can't be consciously perceived. 
The elusive concept of consciousness had, for a time, been neglected in psychology. 
Although questions addressing the nature of consciousness are again legitimate areas 
of inquiry, there is still wide disagreement as to what constitutes consciousness or 
awareness (Natsoulas, 1978). Even if we assume that there are subliminal (or 
nonconscious) effects, the question remains, what "limen" (threshold) are we referring 
to—Detection?—Identification? In other words, how do we differentiate conscious 
from nonconscious states? Although "threshold" was previously considered to be an 
absolute value, currently it is accepted that any threshold is a statistical concept 
dependent on the particular signal/noise ratio and the response criterion of the subject. 
In an effort to clarify some of these issues, Dixon (1971) listed three criteria 
which, if satisfied, would justify the concept of subliminal perception. They are: 
1. The elicitation of contingent responses by stimulation below the absolute 
awareness threshold, where this threshold is itself defined as the lowest level of 
stimulus energy at which the subject ever reports seeing anything of the stimulus. 
2. The retrospective reporting by the subject that nothing of the stimulus was seen. 
3. The occurrence of contingent responses, without reported awareness of the 
stimulus, that differ qualitatively from those elicited by the same stimulus when 
presented above the awareness threshold. 
In studies of early visual processing, masking of a stimulus has frequently been 
used to limit perceptual processing. Masking refers to a secondary stimulus input 
which interferes with processing of the target stimulus. Since Turvey's (1973) 
landmark paper, it has been assumed that the effect of a pattern mask, or a mask with 
a pattern similar to the stimulus pattern, is termination of iconic representation and 
thus the interruption of any information available for perceptual processing. This type 
of masking has been considered to be a central phenomenon and contrasts, in Turvey's 
distinction, to energy, or nonpatterned, masking which operates peripherally, on 
sensory input. 
In a series of experiments. Marcel (1980; Marcel & Patterson, 1978) used masking 
manipulations to vary subjects* access to stimulus information in a manner designed to 
meet Dixon's (1971) criteria defming subliminal processing. Three different tasks were 
utilized by Marcel and Patterson (1978) to determine the briefest SOA (stimulus-onset-
asynchrony) at which subjects could: a) detect the presence of a stimulus, b) judge the 
visual form of a word, and c) determine the meaning of a word. As the SOA was 
reduced, first stimulus detection, then judgments of visual form, and lastly semantic 
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relationship judgments fell to chance level. To quote Fowler et al. (1981, p. 342) 
"subjects showed a sensitivity to meaning at SOAs at which they could provide no 
form information, and a sensitivity to form and meaning at SOAs at which they could 
not make presence/absence judgments." 
In a more recent study. Marcel (1980) replicated Schvaneveldt et al.'s (1976) study 
in which word triples were presented with the associative relationship of the triples 
varied (e.g., HAND-PALM-WRIST, TREE-PALM-WRIST, etc.). The second word 
was a) not masked, b) pattern masked, or c) energy masked; subjects were required to 
make lexical decisions for the first and third words in each triple. Reports taken after 
the experimental task revealed that subjects had no awareness of the second stimulus 
in either of the masked conditions. Yet the data revealed that a semantic relationship 
between the second and third words facilitated lexical decisions for the third word 
more in the pattern masked condition than in the nonmasked condition. Moreover, 
the facilitative effects of conscious (nonmasked) and nonconscious (pattern masked) 
processing were qualitatively different. In the pattern masked condition, polysemous 
words (ambiguous words which have more than one meaning) resulted in nonselective 
access—i.e., both meanings were facilitated. However, in the nonmasked condition the 
context provided by the first word clarified the meaning of the polysemous word which 
resulted in only one meaning being accessed. Marcel (1980) suggests that "Conscious 
representation is of limited capacity in that only one representation or interpretation of 
an event can be entertained at a time" (p. 451), and that "Preconscious perception is 
nonselective and prior context does not affect it" (p. 452). 
The differences in the masking conditions—associative priming was strongest in 
the pattern masked condition, less evident in the nonmasked condition, and absent in 
16 
the energy masked condition—demand a réévaluation of the effects of pattern masking. 
Apparently, energy masking precluded semantic access in the priming task; however, 
pattern masking allowed a nonselective semantic access, but denied subjects a 
conscious visible image. Marcel (1980) and others (Allport, 1977; Fowler et al., 1981) 
propose that pattern masking of brief visual stimuli does not terminate perceptual 
processing but does limit conscious processing, and therefore is a valuable 
methodological tool for studying preconscious or subliminal processing. 
Allport (1977) found that when pattern masking was employed, subjects' reading 
errors were frequently semantically, rather than graphically, related to the target words 
(e.g., kind read incorrectly as nice, drink as wine). In addition, when subjects were 
instructed to report exemplars of a particular category from a four-word pattern 
masked display, the category words were reported with higher frequency than the 
distractor words. In another experiment (Allport, 1977), target word identification 
was facilitated by the semantic relationship between the target and a simultaneously 
presented distractor word. Retrospective reports revealed that subjects were never 
aware that a second letter string had been presented. 
Fowler and colleagues (Fowler et al., 1981) replicated Marcel and Patterson's 
(1978) study with a slight modification in procedure. In order to evaluate the claim 
that these results were artifactual (Ellis & Marshall, 1978; Williams & Parkin, 1980), a 
"nonexperiment" was conducted in which subjects were presented with pairs of words 
and asked to decide which of the words was most likely to have another word "like it" 
based on semantic, phonetic, and graphic criteria. Results for this experiment repli­
cated those of the earlier masking experiments (Fowler et al., 1981, Experiments 1 & 2; 
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Marcel & Patterson, 1978). A variant of Allport's (1977) experiment, which asked 
subjects to report exemplars of a certain category, was also attempted by Fowler et al. 
(1981) and Allport's results were not replicated. Thus, Fowler and colleagues 
suggested that subjects' responses may not be the result of nonconscious processing but 
simply the result of subjects' strategic guessing strategies. Fowler et al. (1981) and 
Marcel (1980) proposed that the problem with Marcel and Patterson's (1978) task and 
with Allport's (1977) task was that subjects were forced to respond directly to words 
for which they professed no awareness, and hence they would utilize whatever 
knowledge was available to them to perform the experimental task. The information 
used could have been based on general knowledge of the English language rather than 
information extracted from the stimulus display. 
In a final set of experiments. Fowler et al. (1981, Experiments 5 & 6) used a 
version of Meyer and Schvaneveldt's (1971) semantic priming paradigm for a lexical 
decision task and found that a semantically related prime facilitated a lexical decision 
for target words. Fowler and colleagues replicated the results reported by Marcel 
(1980). In these last experiments, subjects were not required to respond directly to the 
masked words, and thus the influence of the masked word was indirectly assessed. In 
addition, the lexical decision task was not susceptible to the bias of a guessing strategy. 
This series of experiments by Fowler and colleagues (1981) converge with Marcel's 
(1980) to provide additional evidence for preconscious semantic processing and, just as 
importantly, has provided valuable criticism of previous research. 
In an experiment designed to expand on Marcel and Patterson's (1978) study, 
Huber and Johnson (Note 1) presented letter string pairs of words, nonwords, or 
word/nonword combinations with the strings typed in either same or different letter 
case. When exposure duration was reduced so as to produce chance level performance 
for case discriminations, subjects were still able to make lexical decisions with above 
chance accuracy. In addition, semantic relatedness of the word pairs facilitated 
detection of sameness and appeared to interfere with difference judgments in the 
lexical decision task. The semantic effect was only evident with brief exposure 
durations; as duration was increased and subjects had more graphic information 
available, performance on the case task was superior to performance on the lexical task. 
Research by Avant and Woods (Note 2) utilized the Huber and Johnson 
paradigm, and added a task in which subjects were also asked for meaning judgments. 
A threshold measure was established for each subject at an exposure duration which 
resulted in chance level performance for case decisions, and then this duration was 
used for the lexical and meaning decision tasks. The data indicated that when case 
decisions were at chance level, both meaning and lexical decisions were significantly 
higher. Analyses of report accuracy in the case, lexical, and meaning decision tasks 
revealed that letter case difference was the basis for subjects' discrimination in the case 
task, but in the lexical task subjects were better at detecting words than nonwords, and 
variation in case did not matter. In addition, a consistent response bias operated; 
performance was better on "same" than "different" trials and this bias was the only 
significant outcome in the meaning task. 
This paradigm has been criticized as possibly producing artifactual results 
(Merikle, Note 3; Whitaker, Note 4). Since the criterion for the threshold was forced 
to chance level, the probability of correct letter case decisions for that task could have 
reflected a measurement artifact, Huber and Johnson employed a post test for case 
discriminations and eliminated subjects whose performance was then above chance, 
and Avant and Woods reduced exposure duration for the case task until probability of 
correct report was consistently below chance. The crucial point is that the dependent 
measure for the case task was constrained in a manner that measures for the other 
tasks were not. 
Avant and Woods (Note 5) recently completed a followup experiment with a 
modified design: Threshold was set as before by reducing exposure duration until 
subjects' performance was at chance level on case decisions, then subjects performed a 
case task, lexical task, and meaning task. This modification rendered a case task 
measure independent of any criterion restriction used for threshold determination, and 
thus the case, lexical, and meaning task measures were comparable. Differences 
between mean probability correct for the case, lexical, and meaning tasks were not 
statistically significant. However, when comparing average correct probabilities for 
the different conditions within each task, the data revealed that when subjects were 
asked to make a letter case judgment, the manipulation of case was the only variable 
influencing subjects' performance; lexical status or meaning of the stimuli did not 
matter. Likewise, when subjects made lexical status judgments (word/nonword), the 
lexical status of the stimuli was the important attribute and the other manipulations 
did not influence subjects'judgments. And, when subjects were asked to judge the 
semantic relatedness of two letter strings, the only differentiating characteristic was the 
meaning of the stimuli. Although subjects claimed no recognition of the stimuli, 
subjects did appear to have some strategic control over which stimulus characteristics 
20 
were utilized in their decision. These data, which suggest that subjects have some 
volitional control over a pre-recognition stage of processing provide some difficulty for 
automatic processing models such as Posner and Snyder's (1975), which postulate an 
automatic access that is preconscious and independent of the subject's intention. A 
sharp distinction between automatic and attention-dependent processing may not be a 
tenable thesis. 
Fowler et al. (1981) criticized tasks that had subjects respond directly to charac­
teristics of stimuli that they were not aware of seeing and suggested that these tasks did 
not provide an appropriate measure of preconscious operations. Therefore, Avant and 
Woods (Note 5) conducted two additional experiments which indirectly assessed the 
effects of the stimulus characteristics on subjects' performance. An apparent duration 
paradigm (Avant & Lyman, 1975; Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975; Avant et al., 1977), 
previously used to show the effect of stimulus familiarity on prerecognition processing, 
was employed. The paradigm presents trials on which pairs of pre- and postmasked 
stimulus presentations are separated by I sec, and subjects are asked to judge which of 
the paired stimulus presentations appears to last longer. The two stimulus 
presentations on each trial are of equal clock time, and differences in subjective 
duration are produced by manipulation of the stimulus materials presented in the 
paired flashes. In a previous experiment (Avant et al., 1975) with 30 msec pre- and 
postmasked flashes, subjects judged presentations of a nonword to be longer than 
equal presentations of a word, which were, in turn, judged to be longer than 
presentations of a single letter. Again, when upright and inverted three-letter words 
were used as stimuli (Avant & Lyman, 1975), subjects judged presentations of the 
inverted words to be longer than equal presentations of the upright words. 
A subset of the stimuli used in the case, lexical, and meaning decision tasks 
(Avant & Woods, Note 5) was used in two apparent duration tasks. In the first, letter 
case and lexical status of the stimuli were manipulated; in the second, letter case and 
the meaning of the stimuli were manipulated. In the first experiment, when letter case 
was the same for both letter strings, the same result occurred as in previous studies: the 
two nonwords were judged to be longer than the word/nonword combination, and 
they were both judged to be longer than the two words. However, when letter case was 
altered in the stimulus display, a reversal occurred, words were judged to be longer 
than the nonwords. This result suggests that differences in letter case disrupted the 
"familiarity" of the very common words. In the second experiment, there was no effect 
resulting from the manipulation of semantic relationship of the stimuli. 
Some ambiguity exists in interpreting results from the Huber and Johnson 
paradigm; this operation may not be reflecting prerecognition processing. However, 
the results of the apparent duration experiments are clearly in support of research 
reported by Marcel (1980) and Fowler et al. (1981) which argue that semantic or 
lexical access is not the final stage in the information processing sequence, but rather 
that lexical access occurs automatically and influences very early processing prior to 
the subject's conscious recognition. 
Evidence for Automaticity Across the Life Span 
The preceding sections have provided empirical evidence for automatic semantic 
access that can occur at a nonconscious level, prior to recognition. Since the questions 
of interest focus directly on the development and consistency of such automatic 
processing, a review of the related developmental literature is pertinent. 
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Automaticity in Children's Semantic Processing In the Stroop (1938) color 
naming task, subjects attempted to name the color of the ink in which a word was 
printed. When the printed word conflicted with the ink color (e.g., the word BLUE 
written in red ink) response latencies were longer, suggesting greater semantic 
interference, than latencies in a neutral condition (e.g., the word BOOK written in red 
ink). Findings from the Stroop task parallel the general findings in the priming 
paradigm. An unattended stimulus can influence the subjects' response to a related 
target stimulus, and the effects of the unattended stimulus can be changed with 
manipulation of attentional resources (Logan, 1980). 
Variations of the Stroop task have been used to investigate automatic semantic 
access in young subjects (Ehri & Wilce, 1979; Guttentag & Haith, 1978; Rosinski, 
Golinkoff, & Kukish, 1975; Schadler & Thissen, 1981). For example, Rosinski et al. 
(1975) superimposed words over line drawings of pictures, and obtained response 
latency measures for both word and picture naming. Schadler and Thissen (1981) 
asked subjects to name the ink color of various words. Overall, response latencies 
were slower if the stimuli were incongruent (e.g., the word CAR superimposed on a 
picture of a house) than if the stimuli were congruent (e.g., the word CAR 
superimposed on a picture of a car); furthermore, both experiments provided evidence 
of interference in the incongruent condition even with early readers. There were other 
interesting developmental inferences. Interference from the Stroop effect peaked after 
two or three years of reading instruction and then declined. And interestingly, with 
nonreaders (kindergarteners) and beginning readers (first graders) any letter string, 
even the control condition, consisting of a string of Xs, produced an interference 
effect; by second grade, the interference effect was strongest in the incongruent word 
condition (Schadler & Thissen, 1981). When Rosinski et al. (1975) asked subjects for 
both picture naming and word naming, they found that after only one year in school, 
words had a processing advantage over pictures. These data suggest that any letters 
superimposed on a picture seemed to "catch" very young children's attention, even 
though there was no semantic processing. In addition, evidence is suggestive of early 
development of word associations in young readers. Data from a visual search task 
(McCaughey, Juola, Schadler, & Ward, 1980) indicated that children learn whole word 
patterns prior to the development of orthographic strategies, and by second grade 
process familiar words very rapidly. 
McFarland, Frey, and Landreth (1978) utilized a priming paradigm and varied 
both the name and case of prime and target letters. Second graders benefitted more 
from a prime that was in the same case as the target letter, whereas sixth graders 
benefitted equally from same and different case primes. Frederiksen (1978) varied case 
type (consistent versus mixed) in a lexical decision task with high school age subjects 
of four reading ability levels. Mixing the case of the stimulus letters did not affect 
lexical decision latencies for good readers; however, response latencies for poor readers 
almost doubled with mixed case targets. The adult literature suggested that alternating 
the case of letters in a word did not disrupt the reading process (McConkie, 1979); 
therefore, the effects reported by McFarland et al. (1978) and Frederiksen (1978) may 
be particularly relevant for beginning and/or less skilled readers. These less fluent 
readers do not evidence automatic processing but instead must attend to the physical 
characteristics of the display. 
24 
Schwantes (1981) tested an interactive model of word recognition with third grade 
children and adults. Word recognition can be slowed by stimulus degradation, and 
Schwantes used this technique to manipulate the time subjects attended to the visual 
information. Using a target exposure duration of 500 msec in a lexical decision task, 
Schwantes manipulated context (presence or absence of prior sentence), stimulus 
quality (clear or degraded), and phonology (presence or absence of rhyming words in 
context sentence), and found that both semantic and phonological contextual 
information had a facilitative effect on children's subsequent lexical decisions in both 
the clear and degraded stimulus conditions. However, contextual sentence information 
was utilized by the adult subjects only in the degraded condition, indicating that, with 
intact stimuli, the adults were more likely to process the words automatically, whereas 
the children were always influenced by the available context. 
Using an apparent duration paradigm, Avant et al, (1977) compared early visual 
processing of children and adults. As described previously, this paradigm asks subjects 
to make subjective duration judgments for paired stimulus presentations which are of 
equal clock time. When the stimuli were a letter (A) and a digit (4), both adults and 
children (four and five year olds) systematically judged rotated stimuli (unfamiliar) to 
be of longer duration than upright stimuli (familiar). These data suggest that 
automatic processing may not depend on maturational changes, but may instead 
depend on experience with certain forms and the resultant strength of memorial 
encoding. A second experiment was conducted using good and poor dot pattern 
Gestalts. Only the adult subjects discriminated between forms, and the direction of the 
duration judgments was different than hypothesized: Good patterns were judged to be 
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of longer duration than poor patterns. The authors suggested that processing of 
spatial forms differed from verbal materials for both age groups. In addition, 
children's processing appeared to be slower than adults. With 50 msec presentations, 
the children performed at chance level on a post experiment recognition task, while 30 
msec presentations resulted in high recognition probabilities for the adults. 
Automaticity in Aging Birren (1974) argues that age related changes in informa­
tion processing cannot be accounted for by decrements in sensory input or motor 
output, but instead are due to a fundamental change in central nervous system activity. 
In support of Birren's hypothesis, several studies have found evidence for longer 
stimulus persistence in the elderly (Kline & Orme-Rogers, 1978; Kline & Szafran, 1975; 
Walsh, Williams, & Hertzog, 1979) and, using a partial report procedure (Sperling, 
1960), Cerella, Poon, and Fozard (1982) found that elderly men showed a decline in 
information encoded from iconic store. DiLollo, Arnett, and Kruk (1982) used both 
backward masking tasks and temporal integration tasks to investigate age-related 
changes in stimulus persistence. The results were supportive of increased sensory 
persistence with age; however, DiLollo et al. carefully differentiated age-related 
changes in two different systems. 
As mentioned previously, stimulus persistence, or iconic memory, may well be the 
product of a cognitive process rather than the initial stage of information processing 
(Turvey, 1978). DiLollo et al. adhere to this view and therefore suggest that the 
increased stimulus persistence evident in older subjects reflects the increased time 
necessary for the earlier encoding process. And, the greater susceptibility of the elderly 
to backward pattern masking reflects a reduction in the rate of central cognitive 
processing speed. 
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If age-related changes are pervasive throughout the entire information processing 
system, then decrements in performance should be evident in both attention-
demanding and automatic tasks. If automatic processes are not affected by increasing 
age, the hypothesis of an overall slowing of neural processes must be questioned 
(Birren, 1974; Salthouse, 1980). 
According to a review by Hasher and Zacks (1979), frequency of occurrence 
judgments are easily made by both young and old subjects, and this information 
appears to be independent of other information encoded in memory. Hasher and 
colleagues (Attig & Hasher, 1980; Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 
Zacks, Hasher, & Sanft, 1982) have conducted a series of studies exploring the 
developmental aspects of automatic processing employing frequency of occurrence 
judgments as the experimental task. This paradigm presents lists of items (pictures or 
words) and varies the number of item repetitions. After list presentation, subjects are 
then required to estimate the frequency with which each item occurred. Taken 
together, these studies support the following conclusions: a) There were no 
developmental differences evident in performance in ages ranging from kindergarten to 
the elderly (mean age = 68 years), b) Estimates of frequency of occurrence correlated 
with actual occurrence at .74 and .80 for the elderly and college students, respectively, 
c) It made no difference if recall instructions were given before or after list 
presentation; instructed subjects' performance was equivalent to naive subjects, d) 
Practice did not influence frequency judgments, e) Performance was not inhibited by 
competing demands such as preparing for an additional experimental task. 
The basic frequency of occurrence paradigm was recently utilized in several other 
studies. Kausler and Puckett (1980) obtained frequency of occurrence judgments, 
including incidental and intentional learning conditions (see Attig & Hasher, 1980 and 
Hasher & Zacks, 1979), and added a paired associate memory task. The data 
replicated previous research; the frequency of occurrence task revealed high probabil­
ities of correct judgments, no differences were evident between learning conditions, 
and the elderly subjects performed just as accurately as did the young subjects. Perform­
ance on the paired associate task correlated negatively with age. In addition, correla­
tions between performance on the frequency judgment task and performance on the 
paired associate task did not reach significance, suggesting that separate processes 
mediated the two tasks. 
A distinction has been made by Hasher and Zacks (1979) between automatic 
processes which are genetically inherent (for which the organism is "pre-wired") and 
those automatic processes which are learned through practice. The frequency of 
occurrence paradigm used by Hasher and colleagues is an example of the former, while 
processes, such as word perception, that occur in reading, belong to the latter category. 
Howard, Lasaga, and McAndrews (1980) employed a Stroop-like task to study 
the effect of color-naming interference arising from automatic word 
encoding. Howard et al. (1980) had subjects hold a subspan list of related or unrelated 
words in immediate memory, while naming the ink color of a tachistoscopically 
presented word; immediately thereafter, subjects were to recall the memory list. The 
target word was either unrelated to the memory list, an exemplar of the list, or the 
category name for the items in the memory list. Interference effects on color-naming 
were evident in the list-category-name condition, but were greatest in the list-exemplar 
condition. The older subjects produced longer response latencies, although the latency 
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differences between the age groups did not reach statistical significance. Most impor­
tantly, there were no significant interactions with age on any of the variables, 
suggesting age differences did not affect semantic activation. 
Priming effects in older subjects have also been investigated by Rabbitt (1979). In 
a letter naming task, priming effects with physically identical stimuli (A-A) were not 
afffected by age. When a name prime (a-A) was used, however, the prime facilitated 
letter naming for the young subjects but not for the older subjects. 
Using a different procedure. Madden and Nebes (1980) investigated the 
development of automaticity of visual search with young and older subjects. The task 
was a paradigm (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) in which subjects are given a fixed set of 
items to hold in memory and then must decide if a test item is a member of the 
memory set. The general outcome with this paradigm indicates that, with consistent 
mapping or practice with the same set, automaticity develops accompanied by a 
corresponding drop in response latency. Madden and Nebes found that the rate of 
automaticity development was the same for both age groups; however, there were 
intercept differences, suggesting that the rate of search for the older subjects was 
significantly slower. 
Research Paradigm 
Although considerable evidence supporting a direct semantic access model is 
available in the literature (e.g.. Fowler et al., 1981; Neely, 1977; Schvaneveldt et al., 
1976), the present research was designed to test automaticity specifically at prerecogni-
tion levels of processing within a developmental framework. Automaticity appears to 
operate with children after only one year of reading experience (e.g., Rosinski, et al., 
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1975) and persists relatively unchanged across the life span (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 
1979); however, these results accrue from different paradigms, and the focus has 
differed across studies. In addition to these questions, the particular experimental 
tasks employed in the present study make it possible to differentiate between age 
related changes in stimulus detection versus cognitive processing. 
In the present study, a semantic priming experiment and an apparent duration 
experiment were conducted. The priming experiment was modeled after the general 
paradigm used by Fowler et al. (1981), Marcel (1980), and Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
(1971). This methodology has shown consistent and reliable effects of semantic access 
on preconscious processing. Although this particular paradigm has not been used 
previously with children, category priming (McCauley, Weil, & Sperber, 1976; Ragain, 
1980) and lexical decision tasks (Schwantes, 1981) have both been used successfully 
with young children (second and third graders). 
The apparent duration task has provided evidence for the effects of familiarity oh 
prerecognition processing (Avant & Lyman, 1975; Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975; 
Avant et al., 1977). Subjects in this paradigm are never asked to respond directly to 
verbal information; thus, this experiment has the advantage of providing an indirect 
measure of the effects of lexical parameters on prerecognition operations. The 
dependent measure results from operations that are different from the attended 
operations of the subject, and is, therefore, not influenced by subjects' conscious 
processing. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 17 fifth and sixth grade children (mean age = 11.7, range = 10.7 to 
12.4 years), 13 college students (mean age = 19.9, range = 18.5 to 23.6 years), 15 adults 
in the 30-40 year age group (mean age = 34.7, range = 30.3 to 39.4 years), and 14 adults 
in the 50-60 year age group (mean age = 55.5, range = 50.0 to 59.9 years). The children 
were volunteers from St. Cecilia parochial school, Ames, Iowa, and all had Iowa Tests 
of Basic Skills reading scores above the 90th percentile according to local norms. The 
college age subjects were volunteers from undergraduate Psychology courses, and they 
received course credit for participation. The adult subjects were all University faculty 
who agreed to participate when contacted by letter or phone. 
Stimulus Materials 
The stimuli were nouns, ranging from three to six letters, chosen from the 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) norms with selection criteria being high imageability 
and high frequency of occurrence in printed English. Nine conceptual categories 
(animals, utensils, furniture, body parts, food, tools, clothing, vehicles, and insects) 
with several exemplars chosen from each category yielded 18 semantically related word 
pairs which are presented in Table 1. Nonwords were constructed by making 
anagrams of the words, with letters sequenced to obtain the lowest possible spatial 
frequency count according to Mayzner and Tresselt's (1965) single-letter norms. A 
control condition was included in which the prime was a row of six Xs. Stimulus 
slides were 2" x 2" transparencies made by typing the letter strings onto Mylar 
plastic. The vertical visual angle for all letters was 53% and the horizontal visual angle 
ranged from 1° 19' for 3-letter stimuli to 2°39' for 6-letter stimuli. The mask slide 
consisted of three rows of seven superimposed Xs and Os which subtended a vertical 
visual angle of 1°33' and a horizontal visual angle of 3°5'. 
Initially, two stimulus sets were constructed; Set 1 was formed by designating one 
exemplar in each pair as the prime and the other exemplar as the target, and Set 2 was 
formed by reversing the exemplars used as primes and targets. Final stimulus selection 
for Experiment 1 was guided by the initial testing of 19 college age subjects with the 
two stimulus sets; 10 subjects saw Set 1 and 9 subjects saw Set 2. The data showed a 
marginally significant semantic priming effect only with the Set 1 stimuli (F(2,18) = 
3.09, p .07). The decision was made to use the prime-target exemplars designated as 
Set 1 for the college age group and for all the other age groups in Experiment 1. The 
Set I word pairs are shown in Table 1. 
As shown in Table 2, there were three types of semantic priming relationships, 
determined by the relationship between the prime and the word target: Same Category 
(e.g., CAT-DOG), Different Category (e.g., DESK-DOG), and Control Prime (e.g., 
XXXXXX-DOG). On one-half of the trials, the prime was paired with a target word 
and on the other half of the trials, the prime was paired with a target nonword. The 
priming relationships illustrated in Table 2 were devised for each of the 18 word pairs 
shown in Table 1, producing 6 prime-target conditions times 18 word pair exemplars 
to equal 108 trials for the experiment. 
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Table 1. Stimuli for Priming Task in Experiment 1 
Word Prime 
LION 
CAT 
BOWL 
FORK 
CHAIR 
DESK 
ARM 
FOOT 
APPLE 
POTATO 
NAIL 
WRENCH 
SHIRT 
BOOT 
CAR 
TRUCK 
ANT 
BEE 
Word Target 
TIGER 
DOG 
CUP 
SPOON 
COUCH 
TABLE 
LEG 
HAND 
ORANGE 
ONION 
HAMMER 
SCREW 
BLOUSE 
SHOE 
BUS 
TRAIN 
SPIDER 
FLY 
Non word Target 
EGTRI (572) 
G DO (251) 
UPC (16) 
NSPOO (229) 
UCHOC(198) 
ELTAB (567) 
EGL(166) 
NDHA (96) 
NGERAO (337) 
INNOO (288) 
EMHRAM (309) 
ERSWC (435) 
UBELSO (355) 
ESHO(291) 
USB (49) 
RNTAI (492) 
EDPRSI(317) 
LYF (74) 
^Spatial frequency count as given in Mayzner and Tresselt (1965) norms. 
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Table 2. Example of Prime-Target Pairs for Experiment I 
Prime Target 
Same Category Prime CAT DOG 
Word Targets Different Category Prime DESK DOG 
Control Prime XXXXXX DOG 
Nonword Targets 
Same Category Prime 
Different Category Prime 
Control Prime 
CAT 
DESK 
XXXXXX 
GDO 
GDO 
GDO 
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As is also evident in Table 2, each subject saw a particular exemplar three times 
during the experimental session—once when the target was paired with a semantically 
related prime, once when it was paired with a semantically unrelated prime, and once 
when it was paired with the control prime. 
A different set of words was chosen from the same norms and, along with the 
associated low spatial frequency nonwords used for the threshold determination part 
of this experiment. The stimuli for the threshold task are presented in Table 3. 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented in a Scientific Prototype Model GB tachistoscope with 
2 luminance levels in all three fields adjusted to 21.58 cd/m as measured by a Spectra 
Brightness meter with no stimuli in the fields. 
Response latencies for the priming task in Experiment I were recorded by a 
Lafayette timer interfaced with the tachistoscope. The two manual response switches 
were mounted in a box and placed on the table directly below the tachistoscope 
eyepiece. Onset of the target stimulus started the clock and the subjects' response 
stopped it. 
Procedure and Design 
Initially, subjects were familiarized with the tachistoscope and the procedure. 
During the first part of Experiment 1, a detection threshold was determined for 
each subject in the following manner. Stimuli were words and nonwords, pre- and 
post-masked, presented in the tachistoscope. The subject responded "yes" if he/she 
thought that a letter string had been presented or "no" if he/ she thought that a blank 
slide had been presented. 
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Table 3. Stimuli for Threshold Task in Experiment 1 
Word 
BELT 
CHERRY 
DRESS 
DRUM 
LADDER 
LIP 
NOSE 
PALM 
PANTS 
SAW 
SHEEP 
THUMB 
TURTLE 
Nonword^ 
ELTB (668) 
ERHRYC (390) 
ESSDR(612) 
RMDU(197) 
EDLRDA (366) 
LPI (45) 
ESNO (607) 
PLMA(461) 
NSTPA (298) 
SWA (330) 
EESHP(541) 
UMTHB(325) 
ETLRTU (504) 
^Spatial frequency count as given in Mayzner and Tresselt (1965) norms. 
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Beginning with an exposure duration of 50 msec, the duration was increased or 
decreased in 5 msec increments until performance met the following criterion for 
chance level performance. Trials were presented in blocks of six randomly ordered 
words and nonwords; performance for each subject was considered to meet the chance 
level criterion when an exposure duration was determined which resulted in three 
blocks on which the proportion of correct presence-absence responses was at .50 or 
less and increasing the exposure duration by 5 msec resulted in better than chance 
performance (four or more correct responses) on two blocks. 
The second part of Experiment 1, the priming task, required subjects to make 
lexical decisions for the target stimuli. After giving a "ready" signal, the experimenter 
initiated the trial and the following sequence of stimuli was presented: a) the priming 
stimulus was presented at the detection threshold duration followed immediately by b) 
the mask field for 1 sec, c) the target stimulus for 500 msec, and d) the mask field 
which remained in view until the next trial. Subjects were instructed to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible; if the target stimulus was a word, they were to 
push the button labeled "word," and if the target stimulus was a nonword, push the 
button labeled "nonword." After the subject's response and reaction time were 
recorded, the timer was reset for the next trial. 
The design of Experiment 1 resulted in Age (4) as a between subjects variable with 
Priming Relationship (3), Target Type (2), and Half of Session (2) as within subject 
variables. One presentation of each prime relationship for each target type resulted in 
6 trials; the experimental session included 18 replications for a total of 108 trials. The 
first 2 replications were considered to be practice trials and were not included in the 
analysis. The remaining 96 trials were divided equally for first and second half of the 
session. The stimuli were independently randomized for each subject; the only 
constraint was that all conditions were presented equally in the first and second half of 
the experimental session. Average response latency for each condition was the 
dependent measure. These data were evaluated in balanced analyses of variance for 
each group and then an overall analysis was performed which included all four age 
groups. 
Results and Discussion 
Threshold Measures 
Average threshold durations for the different age groups were: elementary school 
children, mean duration = 18.5 msec (range = 5 to 30 msec); college subjects, mean 
duration = 18 msec (range = 4 to 30 msec); thirty year olds, mean duration = 21 msec 
(range = 5 to 40 msec); fifty year olds, mean duration = 38 msec (range = 15 to 60 
msec). Analysis of the threshold exposure durations for the four groups revealed a 
significant difference among the groups (F(3,55) = 11.78, p< .001). The Newman-
Keuls test ( o = .01) showed the mean threshold exposure duration for fifty year olds to 
be significantly greater than that for any of the other three age groups which did not 
differ among themselves. 
Priming Task 
Response latency scores for each condition were obtained by calculating, for each 
subject, an average response latency for all correct trials after the priming stimulus 
duration interval was subtracted. (The priming stimulus was presented at the subject's 
threshold duration and therefore was unique for each subject.) The first 12 trials. 
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considered to be practice trials, were not included in the data. The remaining 96 trials 
yielded, for each subject, eight responses to each of three types of prime (same 
category, different category, control) for two types of target (words, nonwords) for 
each of the two halves of the experiment. Means of those eight response latencies 
were, then, the measures submitted to analysis. 
Errors 
Accuracy on the lexical decision task was very high; 47% of the subjects made no 
errors. Averaged over subjects, errors occurred on only 3.6%, 1.2%, 0.4%, and 0,6% of 
the trials for the school age, college age, thirty year olds, and fifty year olds, respectively. 
Given the low error rate, statistical analyses were not performed on accuracy 
scores. For the response latency analyses, all trials on which errors occurred were 
omitted. 
Within Group Analyses 
Target Type Not surprisingly, the analysis for each age group revealed a main 
effect of target type as words always elicited faster responses than did nonwords (school 
age, F(1,I5) = 3.55, p <.079; college students, F(l,12) = 13.76, p < .003; thirty year olds, 
F(l,14) = 14.07, p <.002; fifty year olds, F(l,13) = 15.27, p < .002). 
Type of Prime: Word Targets The semantic relationship between the prime and 
the word targets was not a significant source of variance with the school age, college 
age, thirty year old, or fifty year old subjects. 
Type of Prime: Nonword Targets The analysis of response latencies for the fifty 
year old group revealed an interaction between type of target and type of prime that 
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approached statistical significant (F(2,26) = 3.13, p < .06). Newman-Keuls tests failed, 
however, to show reliable differences among the mean response latencies for the three 
prime-target relationships for either word or nonword targets. However, examination 
of the data indicated that response latencies for control primed (XXXXXX) nonword 
targets (573 msec) were longer than response latencies for nonword targets primed by 
either type of word prime (same category = 555 msec, different category = 557 
msec). Perusal of the nonword conditions for the other adult groups (college age and 
thirty year olds) reflects the same general trend as that indicated in the fifty year old 
group. That is, considering both same category and different category primed 
nonwords, latencies for nonword targets preceded by either type of word prime were 
numerically, but not significantly, shorter than those for nonword targets primed with 
control Xs. 
Combined Analysis 
Data for the entire sample were submitted to an analysis of variance procedure 
with Age Group (4) as a between subjects variable and Target Type (2), Priming 
Relationship (3), and Half of Session (2) as within subjects variables. Mean response 
latencies (milliseconds) for all levels of these factors are presented in Table 4. 
As expected, the main effect of Target Type was significant (F(l,55) = 31.65, 
p < .0001). Responses to words (534 msec) were 50 msec faster than responses to 
nonwords (584 msec). 
The second half of the session benefitted from practice as shown by a main effect 
of Half of Session (F(l,55) = 9.69, p <.003). On the average, latencies decreased from 
578 msec in the first half to 540 msec in the second half of the session. 
Table 4. Mean response latencies in milliseconds for conditions within age groups in experiment 1. 
First Half 
Fifth-Sixth College 
Grade Age 
(N=17) (N=13) 
Thirty Year Fifty Year 
Olds Olds 
(N=15) (N=14) 
Same Category Prime 674 518 486 504 
Word Targets Different Category Prime 645 503 496 540 
Control Prime 671 514 496 510 
Same Category Prime 699 572 543 581 
Nonword Targets Different Category Prime 700 560 543 581 
Control Prime 678 600 550 599 
Same Category Prime 609 460 475 504 
Word Targets Different Category Prime 601 488 457 500 
Control Prime 589 492 475 488 
Second Half 
Same Category Prime 630 527 489 532 
Nonword Targets Different Category Prime 691 523 504 533 
Control Prime 663 535 527 547 
(X=654) (X=524) (^=503) (5C=535) 
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Average response latencies differed among groups (F(3,55) = 4.08, p < .01). The 
Newman-Keuls test indicated that the school age children had the longest mean 
response latency and differed significantly ( a = .01) from all other age groups. The 
fifty year old subjects were significantly slower than the thirty year old group ( a = .05), 
and the college age subjects did not differ from either adult group. 
Summary 
Results of the priming task make three noteworthy points. First, the data confirm 
earlier claims that perceptual encoding is slower for the aging subject (Monge & 
Hultsch, 1971; Simon, 1979). Detection threshold exposure duration varied only 3 
msec over the age range from 11.7 years to 34.7 years, but then increased 17 msec for 
fifty year old subjects. 
Second, response latencies for word and nonword target stimuli confirm the 
finding from various other paradigms that words are processed faster than nonwords 
(Fowler et al., 1981; Neely, 1977; Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970). The data did not 
show differences among Age Groups in the processing of word and nonword targets. 
DiLollo et al., (1982) suggest that low-level sensory processes are fully developed in 
childhood and gradually deteriorate in the later years. In contrast, more complex 
cognitive tasks reach a peak later in life and deteriorate more rapidly. The threshold 
measure certainly represented a low level sensory process; subjects only had to report 
the presence or absence of a stimulus. When subjects made a lexical decision, 
however, it necessarily required that contact be made with the subjects* mental 
lexicon. Thus, according to DiLollo's thesis, this later and more complex task would 
not show decrements in processing until late in life. The detection threshold data from 
the present experiment revealed significant changes by age fifty and thus supported 
DiLollo's hypothesis that low-level sensory processes gradually deteriorate across the 
later years. Further, the fact that response latencies for lexical decisions did not 
change from the college age subjects to the fifty year old subjects supported DiLollo's 
arguments that more complex tasks would not show decrements in processing until 
late in life. 
Third, semantic priming was not evident for subjects of any age. For the fifty year 
old group, a marginal interaction between type of prime and type of target showed no 
differential response to word targets; however, responses to nonword targets showed a 
numerical, but statistically nonsignificant, influence of type of prime for nonword 
targets. 
These trends were also evident in data for the two other adult age groups and 
indicate a need to distinguish between a general priming phenomenon in which the 
broad-range lexical storage of words in general is contacted by the prime and a more 
specific priming phenomenon in which the specific semantic meaning of a particular 
word in the lexicon is addressed. These issues will be addressed more thoroughly in 
the General Discussion. 
Although the pattern in lexical decision times to nonwords should be noted and 
consideration given to possible reasons for this trend, the possibility that these effects 
are simply the result of a Type 1 error must also be allowed. Since semantic priming 
with clear statistical support did not occur with any of the four age groups, and only in 
one age group was there an indication of a differential effect on nonword targets, it is 
entirely plausible that chance probability can account for the marginal interaction 
involving nonword targets. 
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The priming paradigm utilized in Experiment 1 did not provide evidence for an 
automatic access of long term memory. A different paradigm was used in Experiment 
2 to provide another test of early prerecognition processing. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 14 fifth and sixth graders (mean age = 11.57, range = 10.5 to 12.8 
years), 10 college students (mean age = 19.30, range = 18.7 to 22.3 years), 15 thirty year 
old adults (mean age = 34.67, range = 30.0 to 38.4 years), and 14 fifty year old adults 
(mean age = 54.57, range = 50.7 to 59.3 years). Subjects were selected by the methods 
described in Experiment 1. 
Stimulus Materials 
Stimuli were chosen to provide a manipulation of lexical status (words versus non-
words) and a manipulation of the specific semantic relationship among words. Three 
words (HAND, FOOT, DESK), a subset of the words used in Experiment 1, were 
chosen to provide the semantic manipulation; two of the three words were from the 
same conceptual category and the third word was from a different category. Three sets 
of nonword anagrams were generated from the above three words to obtain nonwords 
with low, medium, and high spatial frequency counts according to the Mayzner and 
Tresselt (1965) norms. Initially, testing with the college age subjects (N=30) was con­
ducted with each of the stimulus sets; Set 1, words and low spatial frequency 
nonwords (NDHA, OTFO, ESDK); Set 2, words and medium spatial frequency 
nonwords (ANHD, OTOF, EKDS): Set 3, words and high spatial frequency nonwords 
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(DHAN, TOOF, SEKD). Analysis of the pilot data indicated that Stimulus Set was 
not a significant influence, nor did Stimulus Set interact with the variables of lexical 
status or exemplar; however, these data did reveal a significant interaction of 
Exemplar and Lexical Status (F(2,24) = 3.38, p <.04). Based on the testing with 
college age subjects, a decision was made to eliminate Stimulus Set as a 
variable. Stimulus Set 1, the three words (HAND, FOOT, DESK) and the three low 
spatial frequency nonwords (NDHA, OTFO, ESDK) were the stimuli used for Experi­
ment 2. The low spatial frequency nonword set was chosen so as to maximize the 
differences in orthographic regularity between words and nonwords. Stimuli were 
presented in a Scientific Prototype Model GB tachistoscope, and the mask slide, 
luminance level, and visual angles subtended by the stimuli were as described in 
Experiment I. 
Procedure and Design 
As in Experiment 1, subjects were initially familiarized with the tachistoscope and 
procedure. Experiment 2 required subjects to make subjective duration judgments of 
brief pre- and post-masked stimulus presentations which were separated by a 1 sec 
pattern mask. A "ready" signal cued subjects to look into the tachistoscope eyepiece 
and fixate the single blank letter space in the center of the mask. On each trial, the 
first stimulus was presented shortly after the "ready" signal; the mask returned 
immediately and remained for 1 sec; the second stimulus was then presented after 
which the mask returned immediately. Subjects were asked to judge which of the 
paired stimulus presentations appeared to last longer. All of the stimuli were presented 
for equal clock time durations, and any systematic differences in subjects' subjective 
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duration judgments were assumed to be produced by manipulations of the stimulus 
materials presented in the paired flashes. Exposure duration for stimulus presentations 
was set at the average detection threshold duration obtained in Experiment 1 for each 
age group: fifth and sixth grade subjects, 18.5 msec; college age subjects, 18 msec; thirty 
year old subjects, 21 msec; and fifty year old subjects, 38 msec. 
The six stimuli were presented by the method of pair comparisons resulting in 
N(N-l)/2 = IS judgments. All stimulus pairs were presented for four independently 
randomized replications of the procedure, resulting in 60 trials for the experimental ses­
sion. For each subject, the number of "longer" judgments each stimulus received was 
transformed, by Wood worth and Schlosberg's (1954, pp. 252-254) procedure, to z' 
scores. These measures were evaluated in a balanced analysis of variance procedure 
with Age (4) as a between subjects factor and Lexical Status (2) and Exemplar (3) as 
within subjects factors. As in Experiment 1, the data for each group were initially 
analyzed, and then an overall analysis for all age groups was performed. 
Results and Discussion 
Within Group Analyses 
Since automatic processes in reading skill are acquired rapidly in elementary 
school (LaBerge, 1979), the initial analysis for the fifth and sixth graders considered 
Grade as a variable so grade differences could be detected. This analysis therefore 
incorporated Grade (2) as a between subjects variable and Lexical Status (2) and 
Exemplar (3) as within subjects variables. This analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between Grade and Lexical Status (F(l,12) = 6.54, p <.025). Simple main 
effect tests showed that the Lexical Status manipulation produced reliable differences 
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only at the fifth grade level (F(l,12 = 4.75, p < .05). The fifth graders judged nonword 
presentations to be of longer duration than words. The sixth graders did not reliably 
discriminate between words and nonwords, although the direction of their 
discriminations was in the opposite direction; words were judged to be of longer 
duration than nonwords. 
Table 5. Mean z' Scores for Grade X Lexical Status Interaction in Experiment 2: Fifth 
and Sixth Grade 
Words Nonwords 
Grade 5* -.074 +.072 
(n=7) 
Grade 6 +.046 -.051 
(n=7) 
*p<.05. 
An analysis of variance for the grade school age group was performed collapsing 
across grade level with Exemplar (3) and Lexical Status (2) as within subjects variables. 
This analysis revealed a significant interaction between Exemplar and Lexical Status 
(F(2,24) = 4.01, p < .05). This interaction is evident in Table 6 which presents the mean 
z' scores for all age groups. Simple main effect tests revealed that subjects 
discriminated between the lexical status of the stimuli only for Exemplar I, HAND 
and NDHA, with presentations of HAND being judged longer (F(l,24) = 4.37, p < .05). 
Similar simple main effect tests showed no differences in duration judgments for the 
words, FOOT, HAND, and DESK, but duration judgments for the nonwords, 
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NDHA, OTFO, and ESDK, did differ (F(2,24) = 3.87, p < .05). The Newman-Keuls 
tests showed NDHA to be judged as shorter than either OTFO or ESDK ( «= .01 and 
a = .05 respectively) whereas duration judgments for OTFO or ESDK did not 
differ. There were no other statistically significant effects in the school age group data. 
As discussed in the stimulus materials section, the initial analysis of the college 
age group data incorporated Stimulus Set as a between subjects variable. This analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between Lexical Status and Exemplar (F(2,24) = 3.38, 
p <.04). Simple main effect tests showed that subjects judged the Exemplar 2 word, 
FOOT, to be longer than the associated nonword anagrams of FOOT. This analysis 
also revealed Exemplar differences in the nonword condition (F(2,24) = 3.40, p < .05). 
Newman-Keuls tests showed that Exemplar 1 (e.g., NDHA) produced longer duration 
judgments than Exemplar 2 (e.g., OTFO) ( a = .05), but neither Exemplar 1 nor 
Exemplar 2 (e.g., NDHA, OTFO) differed from Exemplar 3 (e.g., ESDK). 
Between group comparisons could not be made with the entire college age group 
sample as Stimulus Set was manipulated in this sample, but data for the other three 
age groups did not include a Stimulus Set manipulation. Therefore, for the remaining 
comparisons, a separate analysis of variance for the college age group was performed 
on the data from the 10 subjects in Stimulus Set 1 condition, and this is the analysis 
used for comparisons among the age groups. The analysis on the college subjects' data 
for Stimulus Set 1 did not reveal any significant sources of variance. Mean z' scores 
for the college age subjects are also presented in Table 6. 
Separate analyses of variance were performed for each adult group, thirty year 
olds and fifty year olds, with Lexical Status (2) and Exemplar (3) as within subjects 
Table 6. Mean H scores for conditions within age groups in experiment 2 
Lexical Status Exemplar Lexical Status X Exemplar 
HAND FOOT DESK 
Words Nonwords NDHA OTFO ESDK HAND FOOT DESK NDHA OTFO ESDK 
Fifth/Sixth 
Grades -.014 +.011 -.050 +.046 -.001 +.070* -.034 -.076 -.168 +.126 +.074 
(N=14) 
College 
Age -.008 +.008 +.056 -.051 -.006 -.021 +.052 -.055 +.133 -.153 +.044 
(N=10) 
Thirty 
Year Olds +.010 -.009 -.042 +.014 +.030 -.020 +.016 +.035 -.063 +.012 +.024 
(N=15) 
Fifty 
Year Olds -.035 +.033 -.089* +.055 +.031 -.074 +.029 -.061 -.104 +.080 +.122 
(N=14) 
*p < .05. 
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variables. Analysis for the thirty year old group revealed no significant sources of 
variance. 
Data analysis for the fifty year old group revealed a main effect of Exemplar 
(F(2,26) = 3.38, p < .05); Newman-Keuls tests did not indicate reliable differences 
between the means. However, perusal of the means showed presentations of Exemplar 
1 (HAND, NDHA) were judged to be of shorter duration than Exemplar 3 (DESK, 
ESDK) which, in turn, were judged to be shorter than Exemplar 2 (FOOT, 
OTFO). Mean z' scores for both adult groups are shown in Table 6. 
Combined Analysis 
The data for all four age groups were combined in an analysis of variance 
procedure with Age Group (4) as a between subjects variable and Lexical Status (2) 
and Exemplar (3) as within subjects variables. This combined analysis showed no 
significant sources of variance. 
The same difficulties of interpretation accompany the results of the second 
experiment that appeared in the first experiment. When responses to the same 
stimulus set were evaluated for each of four age groups, and in a combined analysis for 
all age groups, only the individual analyses for school age children and fifty year old 
subjects revealed statistically significant sources of variance. This paradigm has not 
been used before to test these relationships among stimuli with these age groups. 
While the fragile effects may indicate subtle processing differences that deserve closer 
experimental scrutiny, they may also be parsimoniously considered Type 1 errors. 
Additional research will be needed to clarify the issue. 
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A TEST FOR RECOGNITION 
Several theorists (Allport, 1977; Fowler, et al., 1981; Marcel, 1980) have suggested 
that pattern masking limits conscious awareness but does not terminate automatic per­
ceptual processing. Subjects in two age groups in Experiment 2 appeared to discrimi­
nate between pairs of briefly presented letter strings on a basis other than clock time 
duration. However, subjects were always surprised to be told that the flashes were 
actually of equal clock time durations and that different letter strings had been pre­
sented on every trial. 
To test the assumption that subjects' responses in Experiment 2 were determined 
by preattentive processing of which the subject was unaware, a replication' of Experi­
ment 2 was conducted and followed immediately by a post-experiment recognition test. 
This experiment employed three stimulus sets to replicate the conditions of 
Experiment 2 with college age subjects. Stimulus Set (3) was the between subjects 
variable, and Lexical Status (2) and Exemplar (3) were within subjects variables. All 
conditions exactly duplicated the conditions of the earlier experiment except that 
different stimuli were used. Words were SHOE, BOOT, FORK, and, as before, the 
anagrams for these Stimulus Sets were constructed to be low, medium, or high in 
spatial frequency redundancy (Mayzner & Tresselt, 1965). Therefore, Stimulus Set 1 
included the words and the nonwords, ESHO, OTBO, and RKFO; Stimulus Set 2 
included the words and the nonwords, HSEO, BTOO, and KROF; Stimulus Set 3 
included the words and the nonwords, EHOS, TOGO, and FOKR. Six college 
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students participated in each Stimulus Set condition for a total of 18 subjects. Immedi­
ately following the apparent duration experiment, subjects participated in a forced 
choice recognition test. For this test, subjects received, at the 18 msec exposure 
duration of Experiment 2, individual presentations of the experimental words and 
nonwords as well as an equal number of new words and nonwords. For each of 48 
trials, the subjects' task was to report whether the presented stimulus had been used in 
the duration judgment experiment or was, instead, a new stimulus. 
There were two important results from this additional experiment. Although of 
secondary importance, the Lexical Status and Exemplar interaction replicated within 
Stimulus Set 3, the high spatial frequency set (F(2,I0) = 9.30, p < .005). Newman-Keuls 
tests revealed no differences between the words (SHOE, BOOT, FORK); the nonwords 
did differ significantly with presentations of Exemplar 1 (EHOS) and Exemplar 2 
(TOBO) being judged longer than presentations of Exemplar 3 (FOKR) ( « = .05 and a 
= .01 respectively). 
The most significant result was that subjects were not able to perform at better 
than chance level in the forced choice recognition task. Subjects were not able to 
discriminate between the stimuli used in the experimental task and new stimuli. Thus, 
the assumption that responses in Experiment 2 were prompted by operations that 
occurred at a prerecognition level of processing was supported. 
Suinmary 
Results from previous research utilizing this paradigm have shown that lexical 
status of the stimulus input influenced subjects'judgments with relatively longer 
subjective durations resulting from nonword stimuli and relatively shorter subjective 
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durations resulting from familiar word stimuli (Avant et al., 1975; Avant & Lyman, 
1975). When form familiarity was manipulated by presenting an upright and rotated 
letter (A) and number (4), preschoolers' processing was similar to college students as 
both groups judged the more familiar form (upright orientation) to be of shorter 
duration than the unfamiliar forms (rotated orientaiton). 
If they represent fragile but real effects instead of Type 1 error, the interaction of 
Lexical Status and Exemplar within the Grade School Age Group and the differential 
effect of Exemplar with the older group, evident in Experiment 2, tentatively support 
the earlier studies, at least in indicating a very early prerecognition contact with long 
term memory. The analysis of the complete college age sample and the duplication of 
those conditions in the experiment that preceded the recognition test also revealed an 
interaction between Lexical Status and Exemplar. The college age sample that could 
be used for group comparisons consisted of only 10 subjects and this small sample may 
have hidden real effects. Since, however, the particular pattern of the effects varies 
with age group—reliable effects of the experimental manipulations are not evident 
within each group—these apparent effects cannot be clearly distinguished from 
statistical artifacts. 
Earlier data suggested that discriminations depend upon some characteristic of the 
stimulus input making contact with information that the subject has previously stored. 
The process may be some type of global "familiarity check" that occurs in the first few 
milliseconds of information processing and might be easily disrupted by unusual combi­
nations. A recent experiment from Avant's laboratory (Note 5) suggested that while 
subjects reliably discriminated lexical status of the stimulus input, the direction of the 
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discrimination was very responsive to subtle manipulations. When the letter case of 
the stimuli was alternated, the direction of the word/nonword discrimination was 
reversed. Although the operations performed in this early discrimination have not 
been clarified, they are certainly nonattentional and result in automatic contact with 
long term memory. 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
The data from Experiment 1 indicated that threshold durations were essentially 
equivalent for the grade school, college, and thirty year old groups but increased signifi­
cantly for the fifty year olds. The second part of Experiment 1 required subjects to 
make lexical decisions for word and nonword stimuli which had been preceded by a 
subliminally presented prime stimulus. Every age group responded to words faster 
than to nonwords. There was no evidence supporting a semantic priming effect on 
lexical decisions. The trend in average response latencies for nonword targets 
suggested that for the three adult groups, word primes marginally facilitated the lexical 
decision for nonword targets to a greater extent than did the control prime. However, 
the differences among mean response latencies were marginally significant only in the 
fifty year old group. 
The data from Experiment 2 revealed that the lexical status of the stimuli and the 
particular letter strings used in this experiment influenced the subjective duration 
judgments of two age groups. Grade school age children and fifty year olds both 
showed the influence of these stimulus parameters in their duration judgments. In addi­
tion, data from college age subjects, tested with a different stimulus set, also suggested 
that the stimulus parameters influenced their duration judgments. And a replication of 
Experiment 2 with college age subjects, accompanied by a post experiment recognition 
test, gave no evidence that subjects had any recognition of the stimuli used in the 
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apparent duration task. Thus, evidence was provided that the significant variables in 
this experiment were operating at a prerecognition level of processing. 
The manipulations of lexical status or semantic relationship among the exemplars 
did not result in reliable and consistent influences on subjects' lexical decisions or 
subjective duration judgments. As mentioned earlier, the statistically significant effects 
that were evident may indicate early information processing, but may also be the result 
of chance occurrence. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was designed to address three issues; a) the verification of age-related 
differences in stimulus detection, b) the thesis that permanently encoded information 
can influence early prerecognition information processing, and c) the possibility of 
changes in automatic processing across the life span. 
The data from the threshold task in Experiment 1 provided a clear answer to the 
initial question. Threshold duration measures for stimulus detection did not increase 
until age 50. These results are in accord with the available literature (e.g., Botwinick, 
1978; Corso, 1981; Poon et al., 1980; Walsh & Thompson, 1978). 
Developmental Changes in Automatic Processing 
There is no argument among theorists that increasing age does produce some 
decline in the efficiency of visual information processing. The controversy arises over 
the causes of this age-related change in performance. Theories of life span 
developmental changes can be classified in one of two ways. Some theorists (Birren, 
1974; Salthouse, 1980) begin with the assumption that decrements in performance are 
the result of a general speed-loss mechanism. A general slowing of neural 
transmission, then, would inhibit every stage of information processing. This 
hypothesis is a parsimonious and reasonable explanation of the varied age-related 
deficiencies in processing. 
A large volume of research has been generated from a different perspective. 
Although not derived from a specific theory, most of the research on developmental 
changes in visual information processing has focused on locating the particular stage 
or stages that are most influenced by increasing age (e.g.. Burke & Light, 1981; 
DiLollo, et al., 1982; Frederich, 1974). 
An important advantage of the present study was the separation of stimulus 
detection from cognitive processing. As mentioned, the detection threshold task 
provided a measure of changes in early sensory detection. Presentation durations for 
the automatic processing tasks were then equated, not by clock time, but instead by 
individual threshold durations. The assumption, of course, was that automatic 
processing would then be independent of age-related changes in the stimulus detection 
stage and provide an answer to questions regarding changes in automatic processing 
across the life span. In addition, this study was intended to provide a test of the two 
general theories of developmentally related changes. If there is a general speed-loss 
that is pervasive in the system, beyond stimulus input, then automatic as well as 
attention demanding processes should reveal decrements. However, if sensory input is 
the only indication of an age effect, then automatic processing would be unaffected by 
age and the implication would follow that age differentially affects particular stages or 
types of processing. 
The data did not reveal decrements in automatic processing in the fifty year old 
group. First of all, average response latencies, while differing from the thirty year olds, 
were equal to response latencies for the college age subjects. Interpretations from the 
priming experiment and the apparent duration experiment are made with caution as in 
both instances, thé thirty year old group yielded null results. However, the evidence 
did not indicate differences in automatic processing with the fifty year old group. 
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Results of the apparent duration paradigm suggested automatic processing within 
every age group except the thirty year olds. The pattern of effects differed with 
particular stimulus materials, but if one considers that these subjective duration 
judgment differences are products of only a few milliseconds processing, then only very 
global, easily disruptable effects would be expected. The earlier studies using the 
apparent duration paradigm revealed more consistent patterns of familiarity 
discriminations (Avant & Lyman, 1975; Avant et al., 1975, 1977). However, the 
stimuli used in these earlier studies provided a more dichotomous manipulation of 
familiarity (e.g., upright and inverted letters and words). As the research with this 
paradigm has attempted to explicate the parameters of familiarity and their effect on 
prerecognition automatic processing, the complexity of that processing has become 
increasingly apparent. That stimulus parameters, such as lexical familiarity, whose 
very defmition comes from long-term knowledge, can influence earliest processing is 
apparent; however, specific predictions regarding that influence remain elusive. 
Hasher and colleagues (Attig & Hasher, 1980; Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979; Zacks et al., 1982) have found that automatic processing, as measured 
by memory for frequency of occurrence, did not deteriorate with increasing 
age. However, it was pointed out earlier that a distinction can be made between innate 
types of automatic processing and learned automatic processing. The frequency of 
occurrence paradigm is considered by Hasher and colleagues to be an innate or 
"prewired" automatic processing skill. 
Howard, Lasaga, and McAndrews (1980) found automatic processing of 
semantically related words, necessarily a "learned" automatic process, to be constant 
from age 20 to age 80. And, assuming that they reveal fragile, but real effects, the 
results of this study, concur with those of Howard et al., (1980) in indicating no decline 
in learned automatic processing. 
The Priming Paradigm 
The original intent of this study was to use two paradigms, both testing automatic 
prerecognition access to long term memory, to provide converging evidence regarding 
the hypothesis of automatic semantic access. The priming experiment did not provide 
support for prerecognition processing. A reasonable conclusion would be that a 
subliminally presented stimulus has no influence on the visual information processing 
system. However, the influence of subliminal stimuli on subjects'judgments has been 
indicated in numerous studies (e.g., Allport, 1977; Fowler et al., 1981; Marcel, 1980; 
Philpott & Wilding, 1979). An alternative explanation could be that the experiment 
reported here did not replicate previous research because of a procedural difference. 
Careful scrutiny of the literature revealed three relevant points. 1)A study by 
Schvaneveldt and McDonald (1981) found an effect of semantic relatedness when 
subjects had time to attend to the stimulus; however, they did not find a semantic 
priming effect with very brief, masked stimuli. Also, subjects made false positive word 
decisions to nonwords that were structurally similar to words. The authors 
(Schvaneveldt & McDonald, 1981) proposed a two stage process: a) an initial lexical 
access in which global, structural stimulus characteristics are processed, and b) a 
memory driven "second look" which then has full access to semantic memory. 
Schvaneveldt and McDonald's (1981) two stage process could provide a theoretical 
framework for the present research. The priming task revealed consistent facilitation 
for word-primed nonword targets. A briefly presented word prime may succeed in 
contacting only the very broad characteristics of lexicality or "wordness" and therefore 
facilitate a conscious decision to a different kind of stimulus, a nonwordrThis ~ " 
hypothesis can be tested in the future by varying the time the subject has access to the 
priming stimulus. 
2) The second informative point discerned from the literature was that some 
studies (e.g., Philpott & Wilding, 1979; Shaffer & LaBerge, 1979) found a semantic 
relatedness interference effect rather than semantic facilitation. The implication was 
that stimuli related in meaning were competing for common analyzing mechanisms. 
3) The third and most important point is that the semantic network model of 
memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Quillan, 1967) has been questioned, particularly with 
regard to the excitatory spreading activation concept. This spreading activation has 
been the explanatory concept underlying the priming phenomenon; activation of word 
units in semantic memory excite units for associated words in the memory network 
and thus facilitate activation by reducing the threshold for these related word 
units. An assumption of the Collins and Loftus (1975) model was that semantic 
memory uses parallel processing; activation spreads simultaneously in all directions 
from an activated unit. 
According to Martindale(1981), this lateral excitatory concept is incompatible with 
notions of lateral inhibition; closely related category instances should inhibit each other. 
Martindale proposes that vertical bonds—for example, category names to category 
exemplars—should be excitatory, and category instances should laterally inhibit other 
category instances. Using a priming paradigm, Rosch (1975) found evidence for both 
excitatory and inhibitory effects and suggested a more complex model of semantic 
activation dependent on the interaction between strength of the relationship binding 
category instances and the typicality (high or low) of category instances. Although the 
semantic network (Quillan, 1967), or the spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), 
theory of memory has been of heuristic value, the complexities of the semantic 
network are not yet clear. A recent study (Koriat, 1981) did not find consistent 
differential facilitation effects based on the associative strength of the prime and target; 
but instead, found an interaction between direction of the prime (forward or 
backward) and amount of practice. Forward priming indicates that the prime was a 
category name and the target was a category exemplar (e.g., ANIMAL—CAT) 
whereas backward priming indicates the reverse (e.g., CAT—ANIMAL). Koriat found 
backward associations were effective primes during the first half of the experimental 
session and forward associations during the second half. 
The implications of the spreading activation network hypothesis for the study 
reported here are obvious. The stimuli for the priming experiment were chosen as high 
typicality exemplars within conceptual categories, and the assumption was made that 
excitatory mechanisms would facilitate recognition for highly related words. However, 
the highly related words may have been subject to lateral inhibition rather than lateral 
excitation. 
Similar effects would not be surprising in the apparent duration task. Inhibitory 
relations between semantically related stimuli are probably too subtle in their effects to 
be revealed by this paradigm. Research is needed to clarify the types of prerecognition 
operations that can be studied with this paradigm. 
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The studies cited (Koriat, 1981; Rosch, 1975) were focused on conscious mental 
operations and therefore are not directly applicable to the paradigm employed herein. 
However, the underlying assumptions regarding activation of semantic memory should 
be considered. Studies which have found support for automatic semantic activation 
(Fowler, 1981; Marcel, 1980; Neely, 1977) have used a variety of prime-target combina­
tions, usually selected from association norms (e.g., Palermo & Jenkins, 1964). Associ­
ative relationships (e.g., BREAD-BUTTER) are not the same as category relationships 
(e.g., DOG-CAT), and thus the choice of stimuli in the present experiment may have 
been problematic and prohibited a predictable facilitation for highly related prime-
target category pairs. 
Future research in this area should focus more specifically on stimulus materials 
selection, first verifying pairs that provide facilitation under supraliminal presentation 
conditions, and then experiments can be conducted generalizing that facilitation effect 
to prerecognition conditions. 
Summary 
The apparent duration experiment provided evidence for automatic 
prerecognition processing under conditions that met Dixon's (1971) criteria for 
subliminal, or prerecognition, processing. The particular effects resulting from manipu­
lations of semantic and lexical parameters were not consistent with previous research 
with this paradigm. Evidence for automatic processing was seen in the children and 
fifty year old group data and in the college age sample under certain conditions; 
however, there was no developmental pattern evident in the results from the apparent 
duration paradigm. 
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The priming paradigm did not provide evidence for automatic, prerecognition 
access to semantic memory. Trends in the data suggest the possibility of an early, 
more general, contact with long term memory which provides a discrimination of 
"familiarity" or the global characteristics of "wordness." 
Evidence was consistent with the literature suggesting a decline in the efficiency of 
simple detection with age; however, there was no evidence for a decline in other 
cognitive processing tasks as shown by the speed with which lexical decisions were 
made and by the prerecognition processing in the apparent duration paradigm. 
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FOOTNOTE 
'special thanks are due Juanita Sturm for her assistance in collection of these data. 
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